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Matching Markets under (In)complete Information 1 Introduction
Both empirical and theoretical studies of two-sided matching markets have been useful in applications. Many such markets have developed centralized market clearing mechanisms (in response to various failures of the decentralized market) to match the agents from the two sides: the institutions (firms, colleges, hospitals, schools, etc.) and the individuals (workers, students, medical interns, children, etc.). 1 The National Resident Matching Program is the most well-studied example of this kind of two-sided matching markets. Each year around 20,000 medical students look for a four-years position in American hospital programs to undertake their medical internships. 2 In many countries, each year thousands of students seek for positions in colleges, 3 six years old children have to be assigned to public schools, 4 8 th graders
high school students to high schools, 5 as well as civil servants to similar jobs in public positions scattered in different cities across a country.
All of these entry-level matching markets share two specific features. The first one is the many-to-one nature of the problem: the workers enter the market by cohorts (often once per year) and each worker has to be matched to at most one firm while each firm might be matched to many workers. The second one is the centralized way of reaching a solution: a centralized institution (clearinghouse) collects, for each participant, a ranked list of potential partners and proposes, after processing the profile of submitted ranked lists, a final matching between firms and workers.
Yet, and in order to survive, the proposed matching has to be stable (relative to the true preference profile) in the sense that all agents have to be matched to acceptable partners and no unmatched pair of a firm and a worker prefer each other rather than the proposed partners. Stability constitutes a minimal requirement that a matching has to fulfill if the assignment is voluntary rather than compulsory. The literature has considered stability of a matching to be its main characteristic in order to survive. 6 Indeed, many of the successful mechanisms are stable. This is puzzling because there exists no stable mechanism which makes truth-telling a dominant strategy for all agents (Roth, 1982) . Therefore, an agent's (submitted) ranked lists of potential partners are not necessarily his true ones and the implemented matching may not be stable for the true profile. As a consequence, the literature has studied intensively Nash equilibria of direct preference revelation games induced by different stable mechanisms for a given true preference profile. 7 Not only that, there is also a fair amount of agreement that these studies have provided us with a very good understanding of the strategic incentives that participants face in these markets under complete information.
Nevertheless all this strategic analysis might be marred by the assumption that the true profile of preferences is both certain and common knowledge among all agents; the very definition of Nash equilibrium under complete information requires it. Indeed, participants in these markets perceive the outcome of the mechanism as being uncertain because the submitted preferences of the other participants are unknown.
To model this uncertainty and to overcome the limitation of the complete information set up, we follow the Bayesian approach by assuming that participants share a common belief; namely, nature selects a preference profile according to a commonly known probability distribution on the set of profiles. Since matching markets require to report ranked lists and not their specific utility representations, we stick to the 6 See, for instance, Roth (1984a) and Niederle and Roth (2003) . 7 See Dubins and Freedman (1981) , Roth (1982 Roth ( , 1984b Roth ( , 1985a , Gale and Sotomayor (1985) , Shin and Suh (1996) , Sönmez (1997) , Ma (1995 Ma ( , 2002 , and Alcalde (1996) .
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ordinal setting and assume that probability distributions are evaluated according to the first-order stochastic dominance criterion. Then, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for every von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an agent's preference ordering (his type), the submitted ranked list maximizes his expected utility in the direct preference revelation game induced by the common belief and the mechanism.
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Investigating many-to-one matching markets under incomplete information is important for applications because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). More precisely, we study in many-to-one matching markets direct preference revelation games under incomplete information induced by a stable mechanism. Our main result shows that there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. More precisely, Theorem 1 states that, given a common belief, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if for any profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism.
Theorem 1 has many important consequences and applications. The most important consequence of this result is that it points out that, after all, the former strategic analysis under complete information is meaningful, relevant, and essential to undertake the corresponding analysis under incomplete information. Furthermore, for determining whether a strategy profile is an equilibrium under incomplete information, we only need to check whether for each realization the submitted preference have already used this ordinal equilibrium notion in one-to-one matching markets.
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orderings are a Nash equilibrium under complete information. This also implies that for any stable mechanism, the set of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria is identical for any two common beliefs with equal support. Therefore, any equilibrium is robust to perturbations of the common belief which do not change the support of the common belief and agents may have different beliefs with equal support.
Another important consequence is that the set of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria for common beliefs with full support remain equilibria for any common belief. We show that full support equilibria provide a foundation why any agent submits only preference orderings which rank acceptable only partners which are acceptable according to his true preference relation and the reported ranking over the acceptable partners is truthful. This may help to explain why in markets using stable mechanisms most agents truthfully reveal their preferences over their partners reported acceptable (Roth and Peranson, 1999) . It also gives some insight into the success of stable mechanisms since exactly these equilibria are robust to arbitrary changes of the (non-)common belief. Furthermore, we apply our main result to obtain conclusions about the stability of the outcomes realized under any ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium and when truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the many-to-one matching market with responsive preferences. Section 3 introduces the incomplete information framework to the many-to-one matching market and the notion of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 4 states our main result, Theorem 1, and its applications.
Section 5 concludes with some final remarks and the Appendix contains the proof of Theorem 1. 9 We will describe these conclusions in detail later in the main text. 
Agents, Quotas, and Preferences
The agents of a college admissions problem (or many-to-one matching market) consist of two disjoint sets, the set of firms F and the set of workers W . A generic firm will be denoted by f , a generic worker by w, and a generic agent by v ∈ V ≡ F ∪ W .
While workers can only work for at most one firm, firms may hire different numbers of workers. For each firm f , there is a maximum number q f ≥ 1 of workers that f may hire, f 's quota. Let q = (q f ) f ∈F be the vector of quotas. To emphasize the quotas of a subset of firms S ⊆ F we sometimes write (q S , q −S ) instead of q. Each worker w has a strict preference ordering P w over F ∪ {∅}, where ∅ means the prospect of not being hired by any firm. Each firm f has a strict preference ordering P f over W ∪ {∅}, where ∅ means the prospect of not hiring any worker. A profile P = (P v ) v∈V is a list of preference orderings. To emphasize the preference orderings of a subset of agents S ⊆ V we often denote a profile P by (P S , P −S ). Let P v be the set of all preference orderings of agent v. Let P = × v∈V P v be the set of all profiles and let P −v denote the set × v ∈V \{v} P v . Since agent v might have to compare potentially the same partner, we denote by R v the weak preference ordering corresponding to P v ; namely,
Momentarily fix a worker w and his preference ordering P w . Given v ∈ F ∪ {∅}, let B(v, P w ) be the weak upper contour set of P w at v; i.e., B(v, P w ) = {v ∈ F ∪{∅} | v R w v}. Let A(P w ) be the set of acceptable firms for w according to P w ; i.e., A(P w ) = {f ∈ F | f P w ∅}. Given a subset S ⊆ F ∪ {∅}, let P w |S denote the restriction of P w to S. Similarly, given P f ∈ P f , v ∈ W ∪ {∅}, and S ⊆ W ∪ {∅}, we define B(v, P f ), A(P f ), and P f |S. A college admissions problem (or many-to-one matching market) is a quadruple (F, W, q, P ). 
Stable Matchings
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with firms keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship, complying with firms' capacities given by their quotas, and allowing for the possibility that both workers and firms may remain unmatched.
Formally, given a college admissions problem (F, W, q, P ), a matching µ is a mapping from the set V into the set of all subsets of V such that:
(m1) for all w ∈ W , either |µ (w)| = 1 and µ (w) ⊆ F or else µ (w) = ∅;
(m2) for all f ∈ F , µ (f ) ⊆ W and |µ(f )| ≤ q f ; and (m3) µ (w) = {f } if and only if w ∈ µ (f ).
Abusing notation, we will often write µ(w) = f instead of µ(w) = {f }. If µ(w) = ∅ we say that w is unmatched at µ and if |µ(f )| < q f we say that f has q f − |µ(f )| unfilled positions at µ; f is unmatched at µ when it has q f unfilled positions at µ.
Let M denote the set of all matchings. A college admissions problem (F, W, q, P )
in which q f = 1 for all f ∈ F is called a marriage market or a one-to-one matching market.
Not all matchings are equally likely. Stability of a matching is considered to be its main characteristic in order to survive. A matching is stable if no agent is matched to an unacceptable partner (individual rationality) and no unmatched worker-firm pair mutually prefers each other to (one of) their current assignments (pair-wise stability).
That is, given a college admissions problem (F, W, q, P ), a matching µ ∈ M is stable
(s2) for all f ∈ F and all w ∈ µ(f ), wP f ∅; and (s3) there is no pair (w, f ) ∈ W ×F such that w / ∈ µ(f ), f P w µ(w), and either wP f w for some w ∈ µ(f ) or wP f ∅ if |µ(f )| < q f .
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Notice that this definition declares a matching to be stable if it is not blocked (in the sense of the core) by either individual agents or unmatched pairs. Gale and Shapley (1962) established that all college admissions problems have a non-empty set of stable matchings and Roth (1985b) showed that larger coalitions do not have additional (weak) blocking power because the set of stable matchings coincides with the core. We denote by C(F, W, q, P ) the non-empty core of the college admissions problem (F, W, q, P ). Since sometimes everything but P remains fixed we will often write P instead of (F, W, q, P ); then, for instance, C(P ) denotes the set of stable matchings at P (or the core of P ).
Matching Mechanisms
Whether or not a matching is stable depends on the preference orderings of agents, and since they are private information, agents have to be asked about them. A mechanism requires each agent v to report some preference ordering P v and associates a matching with any reported profile P . Namely, a mechanism is a function ϕ : P → M mapping each preference profile P ∈ P to a matching ϕ [P ] ∈ M. Then ϕ [P ] (v) is the match of agent v at preference profile P under mechanism ϕ. Note that, for all w ∈ W ,
A mechanism ϕ is stable if for all P ∈ P, ϕ [P ] ∈ C (P ).
Responsive Extensions
The notion of a mechanism in which firms (like workers) only submit rankings on individual agents fits with most of the mechanisms used in real life centralized matching markets. But a mechanism matches each firm f to a set of workers, taking into account only f 's preference ordering P f over individual workers. Thus, to study firms' incentives in direct preference revelation games induced by a mechanism, preference orderings of firms over individual workers have to be extended to preference orderings over subsets of workers. But a firm f may have different rankings over subsets 9 of workers respecting its quota q f and the ranking P f over individual workers. For instance, let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 } be the set of workers and let P f be such that P f : w 1 w 2 w 3 w 4 ∅ 10 and q f = 2. While it is reasonable to assume that, under the absence of very strong complementarities among workers, the set {w 1 , w 2 } is preferred by f to the set {w 3 , w 4 } or to the set {w 1 , w 3 }, firm f 's preference between the sets {w 1 , w 4 } and {w 2 , w 3 } is ambiguous since P f does not convey this information. Following the literature, 11 we will only require these extensions to be responsive in the sense that replacing a worker in a set (or an unfilled position) by a better worker (or an acceptable worker) makes a set more preferred; for example, in all extensions {w 1 , w 2 } is preferred to {w 1 }, to {w 3 , w 4 } and to {w 1 , w 3 } but for some extensions {w 1 , w 4 } is preferred to {w 2 , w 3 } while for other extensions {w 2 , w 3 } is preferred to
responsive to the preference ordering
and all w / ∈ S:
(r1) S ∪ {w }P * f S if and only if |S| < q f and w P f ∅. (r2) S ∪ {w }P * f S\{w} if and only if w P f w.
Given a responsive extension P * f of P f , let R * f denote its corresponding weak preference ordering on 2 W . Moreover, given S ∈ 2 W , let B(S, P * f ) be the weak upper contour set of P * f at S; i.e., B(S, P * f ) = {S ∈ 2 W | S R * f S}. Given P f ∈ P f , we denote by resp(P f ) the set of responsive extensions of P f .
Properties of the Core
The core of a college admissions problem has a special structure. The following wellknown properties will be useful in the sequel:
12 10 We will use the convention that P f : w 1 w 2 w 3 w 4 ∅ means w 1 P f w 2 P f w 3 P f w 4 P f ∅. 11 See for instance, Roth and Sotomayor (1990) . 12 See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a detailed presentation of these properties.
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(P1) For each profile P ∈ P, C(P ) contains two stable matchings, the firms-optimal stable matching µ F and the workers-optimal stable matching µ W , with the property that for all µ ∈ C(P ), µ W (w)R w µ(w)R w µ F (w) for all w ∈ W , and for all f ∈ F ,
The deferred-acceptance algorithms (DA-algorithms), introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and denoted by DA F : P → M and DA W : P → M, are two stable mechanisms that select, for each profile P , µ F and µ W , respectively; i.e., for all P ∈ P, DA F [P ] = µ F and DA W [P ] = µ W .
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(P2) For each profile P ∈ P and any responsive extensions P *
coincides with the set of group stable matchings at (P W , P * F ), where group stability corresponds to the usual cooperative game theoretical notion of weak blocking 14 . This is important because it means that the set of group stable matchings (relative to P ) is invariant with respect to any specific responsive extensions of P F .
(P3) For each P ∈ P, the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings and if a firm does not fill all its positions at some stable matching, then this firm is matched to the same set of workers at all stable matchings; namely, for all µ, µ ∈ C(P ), and for all w ∈ W and all f ∈ F , (i) µ(w) = ∅ if and only if µ (w) = ∅, (ii)
Incomplete Information
Clearly any mechanism and any true profile define a direct (ordinal) preference revelation game under complete information.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium) A profile P is a Nash equilibrium (NE) un- 13 Strictly speaking, the DA-algorithm is an algorithm that finds the matching chosen by the "DAmechanism". However, most of the matching literature uses the term DA-algorithm when referring to both the algorithm and the mechanism. We follow this convention. 14 A matching µ is weakly blocked by coalition S ⊆ V under (P W , P * F ) if there exists a matching µ such that (b1) for all v ∈ S, µ (v) ⊆ S, (b2) for all w ∈ W ∩ S, µ (w)R w µ(w), and (b3) for all f ∈ F ∩ S, µ (f )R der complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by the mechanism ϕ if for all w ∈ W , ϕ[P ](w)R w ϕ[P w , P −w ](w) for allP w ∈ P w , and for all f ∈ F and all P *
A large literature on matching studies Nash equilibrium and its refinements under complete information in direct preference revelation games induced by stable mechanisms; in particular, for the mechanisms DA F and DA W . However, for many applications the assumption that the true profile is common knowledge is extremely unrealistic. We depart from it and consider the Bayesian direct preference revelation games induced by a mechanism and a belief about the true profile, which is shared among all agents. A common belief is a probability distributionP over P. Given a profile P and the common beliefP , Pr{P = P } is the probability thatP assigns to the event that the true profile is P . Given v ∈ V , letP v denote the marginal distribution ofP over P v . Observe that, following the Bayesian approach, the common beliefP describes agents' uncertainty about the true profile before agents learn their types. Now, given a common beliefP and a preference ordering P v (agent v's type), letP −v | Pv denote the probability distribution whichP induces over P −v conditional on P v . It describes agent v's uncertainty about the preferences of the other agents, given that his preference ordering is P v . This formulation does not require symmetry nor independence of beliefs; conditional beliefs might be very correlated if agents use similar sources to form them (i.e., rankings, grades, recommendation letters, etc.).
An agent with incomplete information about the others' preference orderings (more importantly, about their submitted lists) will perceive the outcome of a mechanism as being uncertain. A random matchingμ is a probability distribution over the set of matchings M. Given a matching µ and the random matchingμ, Pr{μ = µ} is the probability thatμ assigns to matching µ. But the uncertainty important for agent v is not over matchings but over v's set of potential partners. Letμ(w) denote the probability distribution whichμ induces over worker w's set of potential partners F ∪ {∅} and letμ(f ) denote the probability distribution whichμ induces over firm f 's set of potential partners 2 W . Namely, for w ∈ W and all v ∈ F ∪ {∅},
A mechanism ϕ and a common beliefP define a direct (ordinal) preference revelation game under incomplete information as follows. Before submitting a list to the mechanism, agents learn their types. Thus, a strategy of agent v is a function s v : P v → P v specifying for each type of agent v, P v , a list that v submits to the mechanism, s v (P v ). A strategy profile is a list s = (s v ) v∈V of strategies specifying for each true profile P a submitted profile s(P ). Given a mechanism ϕ : P → M and a common beliefP over P, a strategy profile s : P → P induces a random matching ϕ[s(P )] in the following way: for all µ ∈ M, Pr{P = P | ϕ[s (P )] = µ} is the probability of matching µ. However, the relevant random matching for agent v, given his type
is the probability distribution over P −v which s −v andP induce conditional on P v ). But again, the relevant uncertainty that agent v faces is given by ϕ[
Definition 3 (First-Order Stochastic Dominance) (fo1) A random matchingμ first-order stochastically P w −dominates a random matchingμ , denoted byμ (w) Pw
(fo2) 15 A random matchingμ first-order stochastically P f −dominates a random match- 15 Observe that this definition requires thatμ first-order stochastically dominatesμ according to 13 ingμ , denoted byμ (f ) P fμ (f ), if for all P * f ∈ resp(P f ) and all S ∈ 2 W ,
All mechanisms used in centralized matching markets are ordinal. In other words the only information available for a clearinghouse are the agents' ordinal preferences over potential partners. In such an environment a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium whenever, for any agent's true ordinal preference, submitting the ranked list specified by his strategy maximizes his expected utility for Then a strategy profile s is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE ) in the mechanism ϕ under incomplete informationP if and only if for all v ∈ V and all
Observe that, given a common beliefP , the set of OBNE in a stable mechanism is non-empty. For instance, the strategy profile in which all agents declare that no agent in the other side of the market is acceptable is an OBNE under any common belief all responsive extensions of P f . Note that this requirement is meaningful since the clearinghouse observes firms' rankings over individual workers only and not which responsive extension they use to compare sets of workers. 16 In the definition of OBNE optimal behavior of agent v is only required for the preferences of v which arise with positive probability underP . If P v ∈ P v is such that Pr{P v = P v } = 0, then the conditional beliefP −v | Pv cannot be derived fromP . However, we could complete the belief of v in the following way: letP −v | Pv put probability one on a profile where all other agents submit lists which do not contain v.
14 since a stable mechanism selects, at all profiles P and (P −v , P v ), the empty matching.
Furthermore, any matching µ can be connected to an OBNE s µ in a stable mechanism in the following way: for any v ∈ V and any P v ∈ P v , let A(s
µ is an OBNE in a stable mechanism under any common belief because for any true preference relation, agent v reports acceptable exactly the partner(s) which are both specified by µ and are acceptable under his true preference relation. If information is complete, then any s µ is a Nash equilibrium in ϕ and the outcomes of the strategies s µ is the set of all individually rational matchings (Roth, 1985a) . Both under complete and incomplete information there is a multiplicity of OBNE and the existence of OBNE is guaranteed.
The Main Result and Its Applications
The support of a common beliefP is the set of profiles on whichP puts a positive weight; namely, profile P belongs to the support ofP if and only if Pr{P = P } > 0.
We will show that for stable mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between equilibria under incomplete information and equilibria under complete information. Note that this link holds for any stable mechanism and not only for the deferred-acceptance algorithms.
Theorem 1 LetP be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete informatioñ P if and only if for any profile P in the support ofP , s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ.
Theorem 1 has several important consequences and applications. One immediate consequence is that for determining whether a strategy profile is an OBNE, we only need to check whether for each realization of the common belief the submitted preference orderings constitute a Nash equilibrium under complete information. This means that the uniquely relevant information for an OBNE is the support of the common belief. Therefore, no calculations of probabilities are necessary. This consequence is very important for applications because we need to check equilibrium play only for the realized (or observed) profiles. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, we can use properties of NE (under complete information) to deduce characteristics of OBNE.
Below we turn to the applications of Theorem 1.
Application I: Structure of OBNE
By Theorem 1, a strategy profile is an OBNE if and only if the agents play a Nash equilibrium for any profile in the support of the common belief. Therefore, (i) the set of OBNE is identical for any two common beliefs with equal support and (ii) the set of OBNE shrinks if the support of the common belief becomes larger.
Corollary 1 (Invariance) Let s be a strategy profile and ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(a) LetP andP be two common beliefs with equal support. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP if and only if s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP .
(b) LetP andP be two common beliefs such that the support ofP is contained in the support ofP . If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP , then s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP . for a firm in which order it ranks its first q f acceptable matches. For OBNE with full support any firm submits only rankings which are essentially truthful: the first q f reported workers are the q f truthfully most preferred workers among all workers reported acceptable and the reported ranking over the remaining workers reported acceptable is truthful.
Formally, given v ∈ F and P v , P v ∈ P v , we call P v |A(P v ) essentially P v -truthful if |A(P v )| ≤ q v or for the q v most preferred workers under P v , say w 1 , . . . , w qv , we have for all w ∈ A(P v ) and all w ∈ A(P v )\{w 1 , . . . , w qv }, P v |{w, w } = P v |{w, w }.
For example, if q v = 2 and P v : w 1 w 2 w 3 w 4 ∅ . . ., then P v : w 3 w 2 w 4 ∅ . . . and P v : w 2 w 1 w 4 ∅ . . . are essentially P v -truthful. Observe that condition (i) above will require in addition that A(P v ) ⊆ A(P v ) and A(P v ) ⊆ A(P v ).
Corollary 2 (Essential Truthfulness for Full Support)
LetP be a common belief with full support, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP only if for all v ∈ V and all P v ∈ P v ,
Proof. Let s be an OBNE in the mechanism ϕ underP . Let v ∈ V and P v ∈ P v .
Assume v ∈ F (if v ∈ W the proof follows a similar argument).
equal support, then it follows that a strategy profile s is an OBNE with private beliefs (with common support) if and only if for any profile P in the common support, s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ.
First we show that
Let w ∈ A(s v (P v ))\A(P v ) and P −v ∈ P −v be such that A(P w ) = {v} and for all v ∈ V \{v, w}, A(P v ) = ∅. Let P = (P v , P −v ). BecauseP has full support, we have Pr{P = P } > 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, s(P ) must be a NE in ϕ for P . But then for all v ∈ V \{v, w}, A(P v ) = ∅ implies ϕ[s(P )](v ) = ∅. This and w / ∈ A(P v ) implies ϕ[s(P )](v) = ∅ and ϕ[s(P )](w) = ∅. Hence, by stability of ϕ, we have
. But now w profitably deviates by reporting
and vP w ∅ = ϕ[s(P )](w). This means that s(P ) is not a NE in ϕ for P , a contradiction.
Second we show that 
(ii) does not hold, then for some w ∈ A(s v (P v )) and some w ∈ A(s v (P v ))\W ,
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Without loss of generality, let w ∈ W (if w / ∈ W , then the proof is analogous). Let P −v ∈ P −v be such that (a) A(P w ) = {v}, (b) A(P w ) = {v}, (c) for all w ∈ W , A(P w ) = {v}, and (d) for all v ∈ V \({v, w, w } ∪ W ), A(P v ) = ∅. Let P = (P v , P −v ). BecauseP has full support,
we have Pr{P = P } > 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, s(P ) must be a NE in ϕ for P .
But then for all
Furthermore, becauseP has full support and s is an OBNE in ϕ underP , it is easy to verify that v ∈ A(s w (P w )) for w ∈ W ∪ {w}. Then by stability of ϕ,
, A(P w ) = {v}, and the fact that s(P ) is a NE in ϕ for P , we must have ϕ[s(P )](v) = W . Since v ∈ A(s w (P w )), now v profitably deviates by reporting P v ∈ P v such that A(P v ) = (W \{w }) ∪ {w} because by v ∈ A(s w (P w )),
∪ {w} and both wP v w and responsiveness imply
. This means that s(P ) is not a NE in ϕ for P , a contradiction.
Note that any OBNE for a common belief with full support is an OBNE for any arbitrary belief. Hence, such OBNE are invariant with respect to the common belief and remain OBNE if the agents' beliefs are not necessarily derived from the same common belief. Of course, by Corollary 2, those OBNE are robust to changes of the common belief(s) only if each agent's strategy ranks acceptable only matches which are acceptable according to the true ranking and the reported ranking over the acceptable matches is essentially truthful.
Application II: Realized Matchings
The previous application described properties of strategy profiles which constitute an OBNE in a stable mechanism. For real-life environments we are also interested in which outcomes will be observed. Or in other words, for a given OBNE which matchings are realized ex-post, i.e. after each realization of a profile and its submitted rankings. Since we consider stable mechanisms, any realized matching is stable for the submitted profile. It turns out that all agents unanimously agree that the realized matching is truthfully most preferred among all matchings which are stable for the submitted profile.
Corollary 3 (Ex-Post Unanimity) LetP be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP only if for all profiles P belonging to the support ofP , all µ ∈ C(s(P ))
Proof. Let P ∈ P be such that Pr{P = P } > 0. Without loss of generality, let v ∈ F (the proof for v ∈ W is analogous and easier). Suppose that for some µ ∈ C(s(P )) we have µ(v)P * v ϕ[s(P )](v) for some P * v ∈ resp(P v ). Since the number of filled positions is identical for all firms for any two stable matchings (property (P3) of the core and sta- wP v w . Let P v ∈ P v be such that A(P v ) = µ(v). Then it is easy to check that µ ∈ C(s(P )) implies µ ∈ C(P v , s −v (P −v )). By stability of ϕ and A(P v ) = µ(v),
is not a NE in ϕ for P and by Theorem 1, s is not an OBNE in ϕ underP , a contradiction.
Ehlers and Massó (2004, Theorem 2) showed Corollary 3 for one-to-one matching markets. Note that they could not rely on our general result Theorem 1 which allows the use of simple arguments to show that whenever the agents do not unanimously agree that the realized matching is most preferred in the core of the reported profile, then the agents do not play a NE at this profile.
In the above corollary the core of the submitted profile and the realized matching were related in terms of the true profile. Below we give for one-to-one matching markets a necessary and sufficient condition for all realized matchings to belong to the core of the true profile. Then all realized matchings are ex-post stable, i.e. for any profile in the support of the common belief, the matching chosen for the submitted rankings is stable for the true profile.
A profile P ∈ P is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by the mechanism ϕ if for all coalitions S ⊆ V there exists no P S ∈ P S such that (i) for all w ∈ S ∩ W ,
Corollary 4 (Ex-Post Stability for Marriage Markets) Let q f = 1 for all f ∈ F ,P be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Let s be an OBNE in ϕ underP . Then, s is ex-post stable (for all P in the support ofP , ϕ[s(P )] ∈ C(P )) if and only if for all P in the support ofP , s(P ) is a SNE under complete information P .
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Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and the fact that for any profile P and any NE s(P ) in ϕ under complete information P , ϕ[s(P )] ∈ C(P ) if and only if s(P ) is a SNE in ϕ under complete information P (Shin and Suh, 1996; Sönmez, 1997).
For college admissions problems, under complete information it is known that the outcome of a SNE might not be stable under the true profile (Ma, 2002 , Example 1).
Therefore, in general the requirement that for any profile in the support the agents play a SNE is not sufficient for an OBNE to be ex-post stable. However, since the set of stable matchings coincides with the core, in college admissions problems this condition remains necessary for OBNE to be ex-post stable.
Application III: Truth-Telling
When agents' preferences are private information, we would like to design a mechanism which elicits the true preferences from the agents. In order to guarantee that agents truthfully report their preferences, incentive-compatible mechanisms make it a (weakly) dominant strategy to report truthfully. Incentive-compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that for any profile truth-telling is a NE under complete information. Therefore, incentive-compatibility is equivalent to truth-telling being an OBNE for all common beliefs.
Since incentive-compatibility is a strong condition, our incomplete information environment allows a weaker (but still natural) condition. Given a common belief and a mechanism, Bayesian incentive-compatibility requires that all agents truthfully reveal their preferences at any profile belonging to the support of the common belief. By our powerful result Theorem 1, in many-to-one matching markets for stable mechanisms Bayesian incentive-compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that truth-telling is a NE under complete information for any profile belonging to the support of the common belief. Now it follows directly from Corollary 3 that truth-telling is an OBNE only if the core is singleton at any realized profile.
Corollary 5 LetP be a common belief. Then, truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable mechanism under incomplete informationP only if the support ofP is contained in the set of all profiles with a singleton core.
Since in college admissions problems incentive compatibility is equivalent to Bayesian incentive-compatibility for a common belief with full support, Roth's (1982) result (there exists no mechanism which is both stable and incentive-compatible) follows from Corollary 5 because there exist profiles with non-singleton core.
By Theorem 1, singleton cores would be sufficient for truth-telling to be an OBNE if at any profile belonging to the support of the common belief, truth-telling is a NE under complete information. By Roth (1985a) we know that this is not the case since he provides an example with singleton core where truth-telling is not a NE under complete information. Specifically, in his example a firm with more than one position profitably manipulates.
If each firm has exactly one position, then Ehlers and Massó (2004) show that singleton core is sufficient for truth-telling to be a NE in any stable mechanism under complete information. Therefore, we obtain the principal result of Ehlers and Massó 
Final Remarks
In many-to-one matching markets Theorem 1 provides for stable mechanisms a strong link between OBNE under incomplete information and NE under complete information. The following peculiarities of college admissions problems are important for the main result: (p1) any firm fills the same number of positions under any two stable optimal matching, when new workers become available all firms weakly prefer any matching, which is stable for the enlarged problem, to the workers-optimal matching of the original problem.
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It is clear that the link in Theorem 1 is in general not true for BNE. For instance, in the two-player game of matching pennies we may interpret each agent's pure strategies (heads and tails) as his possible types. Now if the common belief comes from two independent marginal beliefs that put probability 1 2 on each type, and hence, the common belief puts probability 1 4 on each strategy profile (as in the unique NE in mixed strategies), then truth-telling is a BNE under this common belief whereas the game does not have any NE (in pure strategies) under complete information.
It would be interesting to identify other economic environments where a similar link between BNE under incomplete information and NE under complete information holds. In those environments the strategic analysis under complete information is essential to undertake the corresponding analysis under incomplete information. For determining whether a strategy profile is an equilibrium under incomplete information, we only need to check whether for each realization the submitted preference orderings are a Nash equilibrium under complete information. Furthermore, if this link holds, then any BNE is robust to perturbations of the common belief which do not change the support of the common belief and agents may have private beliefs with equal support.
APPENDIX
Before we prove Theorem 1, we recall the following properties of the core of a college admissions problem. These properties will be used frequently in the proof. It will be convenient to write (F, W, P ; q) for any college admissions problem (F, W, q, P ) in which q f = 1 for all f ∈ F .
A.1 Properties of the Core
(I) For each P ∈ P, the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 , Theorems 5.12 and 5.13); namely, for all µ, µ ∈ C(P ), and for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , (i) if µ(w) = ∅, then µ (w) = ∅; (ii) |µ(f )| = |µ (f )|;
(II) Given (F, W, q, P ), split each firm f into q f identical copies of itself (all having the same preference ordering P f ) and let F be this new set of f ∈F q f splitted firms.
Set q f = 1 for all f ∈ F and replace f by its copies in F (always in the same order) in each worker's preference relation P w . Then, (F , W, P ; q ) is a marriage market for which we can uniquely identify its matchings with the matchings of the original college admissions problem (F, W, q, P ), and vice versa (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 , Lemma 5.6). Then, and using this identification, we write C(F, W, q, P ) = C(F , W, P ; q ).
(III) Consider a marriage market (F, W, P ; q) and suppose that new workers enter the market. Let (F, W , P ; q) be this new marriage market where W ⊆ W and P agrees with P over F and W . Let
all µ ∈ C(F, W , P ; q) (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985; Crawford, 1991) .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. LetP be a common belief, s be a strategy profile and ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(⇐) Suppose that for any profile P in the support ofP , s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ. Let v ∈ V and P v ∈ P v be such that Pr{P v = P v } > 0. By the previous fact, then we have for all P v ∈ P v and all P −v ∈ P −v such that
and s is an OBNE in ϕ underP , the desired conclusion.
(⇒) Let s be an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete informationP .
First we show that for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P = P } > 0,
If for some P in the support ofP and for some
By the stability of ϕ and our choice of P v , we have
all P −v ∈ P −v . Let v ∈ F (the case v ∈ W is analogous and easier). We choose a responsive extension P *
which means that s is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ underP , a contradiction. Hence, (2) holds.
Second suppose that there is some P ∈ P such that Pr{P = P } > 0 and s(P )
is not a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the direct preference 28 revelation game induced by ϕ. Then (w.l.o.g.) there exist f ∈ F , P f ∈ P f , and a responsive extension P * f of P f such that
The case where a worker has a profitable deviation is analogous to the case where a firm with quota one has a profitable deviation.
Case 1: There exists k ∈ {1, . . . , |µ (f )|} such that w k P f w k and w l R f w l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Note that w k ∈ A(P f ) because w k P f w k and by (2), w k ∈ µ(f ) ⊆ A(P f ). Let
First we show that ϕ[P f , s −f (P −f )](f ) contains at least k workers. Note that any profile implicitly specifies the set of agents of the matching problem. For the time being, below we specify both the profile and the quota of the matching problem.
Because ϕ is stable and ϕ[P f , s −f (P −f )] = µ , we have µ ∈ C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q). Let µ be the matching for the problem (F, W \{w k+1 , . . . ,
By our choice of P f , we have µ (f ) ⊆ A(P f ) and P f |A(P f ) = P f |A(P f ). Hence, we also have by (4),
Thus, by µ (f ) = {w 1 , . . . , w k } and the fact that any firm is matched to the same number of workers under all stable matchings, firm f is matched to k workers for all matchings belonging to C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+1 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+1 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); k, q −f ).
to fewer than k workers for someμ ∈ C(P f , s −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } (P −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } ); q), thenμ is also stable under (P f , s −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } (P −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } ); k, q −f ), a contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k workers in any stable matching belonging to C(P f , s −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } (P −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } ); q).
Now when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split firm f into q f copies (all having the same preferenceP f ) and each copy of firm f weakly prefers according toP f any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q) to this matching. Since at least k copies of f are matched to a worker under the worker optimal matching in C(P f , s −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } (P −{f }∪{ŵ k+1 ,...,ŵ |μ(f )| } ); q), at least k copies of f are matched to a worker in any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q).
On the other hand, ϕ[P f , s −f (P −f )](f ) contains fewer than k workers. Letμ = ϕ[P f , s −f (P −f )]. Letμ be the matching for the problem (F, W \(μ(f )\A(P f )), q, (P f , s −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) (P −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) ))) such thatμ (f ) =μ(f )∩A(P f ) andμ (f ) = µ(f ) for all f ∈ F \{f }. Sinceμ ∈ C(P f , s −f (P −f ), q) andμ(f ) contains fewer than q f workers, we must haveμ ∈ C(P f , s −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) (P −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) ); q). Thus, bỹ µ (f ) ⊆ A(P f ) andP f |A(P f ) = P f |A(P f ), we also obtaiñ µ ∈ C(P f , s −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) (P −{f }∪(μ(f )\A(P f )) ); q). Hence, in any matching belonging to this core firm f is matched to |μ (f )| = |μ(f )∩A(P f )| workers. Now when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split each firm f ∈ F \{f } into q f copies (all having the same preference s f (P f )) and each copy of firm f weakly prefers according to s f (P f ) any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q) to this matching.
Thus, in total all the copies of all firms f ∈ F \{f } receive at least the same number of workers in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q) as they did previously. Since exactly |μ(f )\A(P f )| new workers are available and f was matched to |μ (f )| = |μ(f ) ∩ A(P f )| workers before, firm f can be matched to at most |μ(f )| workers under any stable matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q). Since |μ(f )| is smaller than k, this contradicts (9) and the fact that under responsive preferences, firm f is matched to the same number of work-32 ers for any two matchings in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q). Hence, ϕ[P f , s −f (P −f )](f ) cannot contain fewer than k workers.
Case 2: Otherwise.
Then we have w l R f w l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , min{|µ(f )|, |µ (f )|}}. Let k = |µ(f )|. If |µ (f )| ≤ µ(f ), then by responsiveness of P * f and µ(f ) ⊆ A(P f ), we have µ(f )R * f µ (f ), which contradicts (3). Hence, we must have |µ (f )| > |µ(f )| = k, q f > k, and w k+1 ∈ A(P f ). Let P f ∈ P f be such that A(P f ) = B(w k+1 , P f ) and P f |A(P f ) = P f |A(P f ).
Since µ(f ) ⊆ B(w k+1 , P f ) = A(P f ) and µ(f ) does not fill the quota of firm f , we must have µ ∈ C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q). Hence, firm f is matched to k workers under any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q). (10) On the other hand, let µ be the matching for the problem (F, W \{w k+2 , . . . , w |µ (f )| }, (k+ 1, q −f ), (P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ))) such that µ (f ) = {w 1 , . . . , w k+1 } and µ (f ) = µ (f ) for all f ∈ F \{f }. Then from µ ∈ C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q) it follows that µ ∈ C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); k + 1, q −f ). Thus, by µ (f ) ⊆ B(w k+1 , P f ) = A(P f ) and P f |A(P f ) = P f |A(P f ), µ ∈ C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); k + 1, q −f ). Now if firm f is matched to fewer than k + 1 workers in some matching belonging to C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); q), then this matching is also stable for the problem (P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); k + 1, q −f ), a contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k + 1 workers in any stable matching belonging to C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); q). Now when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split firm f into k + 1 copies (all having the same preference P f ) and each copy of firm f weakly prefers according to P f any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q) to this matching. Since at least k + 1 copies of f are matched to a worker under the worker optimal matching in C(P f , s −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } (P −{f }∪{w k+2 ,...,w |µ (f )| } ); q), at least k + 1 copies of f must be also matched to a worker under any matching in C(P f , s −f (P −f ); q), which contradicts (10) and the fact that firm f is matched to the same number of workers
